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The Lytton Report

discussed by

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NATHANIEL PEFFER

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The Lytton Report

MR. JAMES G. McDONALD, Chairman

TODAY our subject needs no justification. There is in the international political field no problem more important at the moment than the one which is to be discussed today, the Lytton Report. Our arrangement for this meeting is a little different from our usual one. We hope that Mr. Peffer, who follows Professor Blakeslee, will not agree in every detail with Professor Blakeslee's interpretation; on the other hand, this meeting has not been planned as it usually happens with us, to have a definite and sharp clash of views. Instead, we have asked Professor Blakeslee, who was a member of the Commission in a technical capacity, to present the report as he sees it and give us as full a treatment as he can in the half hour, and we have asked Mr. Peffer, as a distinguished student of the Far East, to present his point of view. Then, in the discussion period, we hope that several other views will be presented more briefly.

Professor Blakeslee has been a member of the Executive Committee of the Institute of Pacific Relations since 1925. He attended the Institute of Pacific Relations in the Far East in 1927 and 1929, was an officer for a time in the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, and was Counselor to the American members of the League of Nations Commission of Inquiry in the Far East, that is, the Lytton Commission; and throughout all of these other activities, he has managed to remain professor of history and international relations at Clark University.

It reminds me that the academic field must be very attractive these days for, as far as I can see, none of my academic friends are ever bothered with students or teaching at all—certainly Professor Blakeslee seems not to have been. But the most distinguished position Professor Blakeslee occupies or has occupied is that of Vice Chairman of the Worcester Branch of the Foreign Policy Association. He is also the author of "The Pacific Area, an International Survey."

It is a great pleasure to introduce my old friend, Professor Blakeslee.

DR. GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FRIENDS: It is a pleasure to be introduced by Dr. McDonald. It reminds me of the happy days which he and I spent together in Kyoto during the Conference of the Institute of Pacific

Relations in 1929, when he presided so graciously and effectively over some of the most important of the discussion groups.

The five members composing the Lytton Commission received many bouquets when they were in the Far East, literally and figuratively, and since they have presented their report they have received added tributes. One of your intellectual leaders here in New York has characterized the report as one of the greatest documents in history. Another has called it "the most important international document since the Renaissance."

Since I am afraid that Mr. Peffer, with his usual graciousness, will not present, in opposition, any critical estimate of the Commission, may I in introduction quote for you a few sentences from a handbill, issued by the Young Communist Party, which was distributed throughout Hankow, China, when we were there? It said: "The Commission are not messengers of peace as they are called. They are merely the spies of the international bandit organization, the League of Nations. They are the pioneers for the partition of China. They are the enemies of the world's oppressed peoples. Down with the League Commission of Inquiry, the faithful hounds of imperialism."

Now you may see why the Lytton Commission was so critical of the Communists in Central China! With these two opposing pictures of the Commission—we always need a balanced presentation in the Foreign Policy Association—may we pass seriously to a discussion of the Lytton Report?

In every great piece of music—so I am informed by my musical friends —there is a motif or theme which runs through the entire production, constantly appearing and reappearing. So it is in the Lytton Report. Its theme is: China and Japan should cooperate; it is better to cooperate than it is to fight. The report points out that China has the great internal task of developing a strong central government and in that task Japan should be able to render assistance. Japan has the great economic task of supporting a large population in a small territory; and it needs access to China's markets. For both of these tasks there is needed a measure of cooperation and of good will between China and Japan, but there can be neither cooperation nor good will until the Manchurian situation is settled and settled equitably.

What is the Manchurian issue? Manchuria, an empire in extent, with great fertile plains and valuable mineral resources, was until a few months ago, universally admitted to be a part of China; but it was a part of China in which Japan had peculiar, exceptional, and in some instances semi-sovereign rights. These rights, however, were based on treaties and agreements regarding whose validity, interpretation, and in some cases even existence, China and Japan were constantly at odds. There was, too, a fundamental clash of national policies. China, with its rising nationalism,

wished to limit these Japanese rights and to develop Manchuria itself. Japan, on the other hand, wished to maintain its rights and even to extend them, since there had gradually developed in the minds of the Japanese people the conviction that Manchuria is "the life line of Japan." So friction naturally increased between China and Japan until it led to the incident of September 18, 1931.

That incident was interpreted by the Japanese as an attack by the Chinese army on the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway. It was interpreted by the Chinese as merely an explosion which served as a signal for a prearranged Japanese attack. However that may be, within twenty-four hours the Japanese military forces were in control of most of the Chinese cities in southeastern Manchuria. Later, after long discussions at Geneva, the Council of the League, with the consent and approval of both China and Japan, appointed the Lytton Commission to go to the Far East and study this controversy on the spot.

The members of the Commission spent six months in studying "on the spot" conditions in Japan and China. They availed themselves of every possible means of obtaining information as to facts and points of view. They held long conferences, sometimes repeated conferences, with the leading members of the Japanese Government, early in March and again in July; with the members of the Chinese Government at Nanking, late in March and in June; with Marshal Chang Hsueh-Liang, the head of the local administration at Peking; and with members of the Manchoukuo Cabinet at Changchun. They received hundreds of documents, books, pamphlets, maps and mimeographed articles. Each official document presented by either the Chinese or the Japanese was later handed to the representatives of the other party, and an opportunity given for a reply. The Commission thus had the benefit of statements carefully prepared by each side and also of rebuttals by each side. The Commissioners had interviews with hundreds of Chinese and Japanese, each one of whom was important either in his own right or as a representative of some group or organization. They talked with scores of foreigners, including business men and missionaries; and whatever we may think of missionaries, we should not forget the fact that they are in very close touch with the feeling and viewpoint of the masses of the Chinese people with whom they are working. Each Commissioner also had access to the archives of the Legation of his country in Peiping and to the material in his country's consulates, especially in Manchuria. Then there were the many letters and petitions received, especially from the Chinese—some two thousand in Manchuria alone. Finally the Commissioners kept their eyes and ears open—an education in itself.

To make even clearer the extent of the Commission's investigation, I might refer to their study of the incident of September 18, which is the

beginning of the present acute phase of the Manchurian controversy. The Commission received official statements regarding this incident from both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments. They held interviews or conferences, in some cases two or three of them, with each Japanese and Chinese military officer who held either general or local command which connected him in some way with the incident. These included General Honjo, the commander-in-chief of all the Japanese forces in Manchuria; the Japanese colonel who commanded the Japanese troops in Mukden; the Japanese lieutenant who was in charge of the patrol on the railway at the time of the explosion, and who, due to the kindness of the Japanese authorities, was brought from northern Manchuria to Mukden to testify before the Commission; the Japanese who stated that he repaired the track where the explosion took place; the Chinese officer who commanded the 10,000 troops in the Chinese barracks; and his superior Chinese commanding officer. The Commission studied the official account presented to them by the Japanese and compared this with the official statements given out shortly after the explosion and also with the early reports of the foreign military attaches; they talked with the foreigners in Mukden who were in a position to throw light on the problem. Then, under the guidance of the Japanese, they visited the spot where the alleged explosion took place, and later walked to the site of the attack of the Japanese on the Chinese barracks; and examined the barracks—even looked into the rifle holes! Only after they had done all of that, did they make their report. I submit that is a very thorough kind of investigation.

After visiting Manchuria, and immediately before undertaking the task of writing the report, the Commission went to Japan and remained there for some two weeks. Japan is one of the most charming countries in the world, and the Japanese, whom one meets at such an occasion as a dinner by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, are outstanding for their ability and their combined dignity and graciousness. They would be a credit to the government of any country.

In expressing admiration for the civil leaders of Japan I am confident that I am expressing a view which was shared by every member of the Commission and by every member of the staff. That attitude is an important fact since it makes it evident that when the Commission went back to Peking to write the report, they had no animus against any country. The Commissioners were neither pro-Japanese nor pro-Chinese.

I wish you might have been in Peking and sensed the feeling which pervaded the Commission and the whole staff. There was an earnest determination to write the fairest possible history of events, well-balanced, just and clear; and then there was an intense desire to find a solution which, within the limits of justice and treaty obligations, might end this unhappy Sino-Japanese controversy. I thought at the time, and remarked to some

of my friends, that the way to make a diplomat or a distinguished official almost a religious person is to appoint him a member of a commission of inquiry, because then his duty, his business, that which he thinks about all day long, is how he can bring together two countries whose controversy he is studying, and help them to cooperate and develop a measure of good will.

What then was the report?

Regarding China as a whole, the Commission reported that it needed a measure of international assistance in its great task of developing a strong central government.

As for Manchuria, the report stated that the situation before September 18 was unsatisfactory. The Japanese had legitimate grounds for complaint, and so had the Chinese; and both Japan and China were to blame for the conditions which existed.

Regarding the series of events which began with September 18, the Commission reported:

(1) the Japanese military measures on September 18 and immediately following were not justified by the principle of self-defense;

(2) Manchoukuo was created by the Japanese and not primarily by the Chinese; Manchoukuo is controlled by Japanese and is supported and maintained by the Japanese army;

(3) the great majority of the people of Manchuria are opposed to Manchoukuo and regard that government as a form of Japanese rule;

(4) the maintenance and the recognition of Manchoukuo would not be in accordance with the fundamental principles of existing international treaties.

As for recommendations, the Commission does not recommend either the *status quo* or Manchoukuo. They advise the creation of an autonomous régime for Manchuria under the genuine sovereignty of China. This plan is based upon a political conception which is, of course, familiar to us Americans, since it would give to Manchuria a form of government somewhat similar to that of our American state.

The main features of the general plan of settlement include: the assistance of a number of foreign advisers in the autonomous régime and in particular of two foreign advisers, one of whom would have practically complete control over the constabulary, and the other over finance; a provision for bringing about harmony between the Chinese and the Japanese railroad systems through either a commission similar to the American Interstate Commerce Commission or a holding company which would amalgamate the two systems; demilitarization of Manchuria with a pro-

vision that the only military forces should be the constabulary; a treaty between China and Japan to specify and practically guarantee Japanese legitimate rights in Manchuria; and a further treaty dealing with commercial relations, which should include a promise by China that so far as possible, it would suppress the anti-Japanese boycott. The details of the settlement, the Commission recommends, should be worked out in an advisory conference composed of representatives of China, Japan, and of the inhabitants of Manchuria.

Those recommendations seem to be fair to China, since they preserve the integrity of China; fair to Japan, since they give to Japan every essential right which it claimed before September 18; fair to the people of Manchuria, since the provisions give promise of peace, stability and a reasonable measure of good government; and fair to the world as a whole, since provision is made for the Open Door.

If this report is so eminently fair in every way, why is there any question as to its adoption? For the reason that many of the Chinese—of course, I speak deferentially in the presence of these eminent Chinese leaders here at the speakers' table, especially of Dr. H. H. Kung—feel that the report recommends undue interference with Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria; and that many if not most of the Japanese believe that they can probably gain more from the Manchoukuo plan than from that recommended by the Commission.

What then is the prospect that the report will be adopted? To answer that query would lead one into the dangerous realm of prophecy. It may be stated, however, that so far as one can judge, it is apparently the general opinion that the Council and Assembly of the League, after a reasonable amount of discussion and possible delay, will accept the findings of the Commission as accurate and its recommendations as an equitable basis for negotiations between China and Japan. It appears, too, to be the general belief that the Chinese Government, after the presentation of the Chinese point of view, will also accept the Commission's report as the basis for negotiations.

As for Japan, it certainly is too early to state with certainty that the Japanese Government will reject this report. One of my special friends on the Commission said to me often during the past months, "We should not forget that in the past when facing great national problems, the leaders of Japan have shown marked restraint and marked wisdom." Let us trust that in dealing with the report they will show these same qualities again.

There are many, moreover, who believe that even if Japan should not accept the report in the immediate future, it may very likely decide to do so within one to four years, due to the heavy financial losses which it is expected it will suffer during that time, due in part to the expensive mili-

tary operations in Manchuria, and in part to the Chinese boycott against Japanese goods. If these anticipated losses should continue for some years, it is contended that the leaders and the thoughtful classes of Japan will very probably come to the conclusion that even from the viewpoint of the national interest of Japan, it would be better to accept the proposals of the Lytton Commission than it would be to go on with the Manchoukuo experiment. Certainly the Commission believes that that is the situation.

In the meantime, what are the prospects in Manchuria? There is a sharp difference of opinion regarding probable developments in Manchuria, due to a difference of view as to the interpretation of Chinese history and Chinese psychology.

The Japanese state that they will eventually suppress the volunteers and the bandits and establish a condition of peace and order in Manchuria. They admit that it may take a long time; one of their most distinguished generals has said that it might take ten years. But when this task has once been accomplished, they are convinced, from their study of Chinese history and Chinese psychology, that the Chinese people in Manchuria will accept the situation, and the Chinese Government south of the Great Wall will recognize Manchoukuo. "That is the Chinese way," the Japanese say, "to acquiesce in what has been forced upon them as a *fait accompli* by major military force." Manchoukuo, they believe, may thus lead to a peaceful and permanent settlement in the Far East.

For that view the Japanese have very little support outside of Japanese circles. The Commission, all the Chinese whom I ever knew, and most of the foreigners in the Far East, believe that if the Japanese should succeed in suppressing armed opposition, neither the Chinese in Manchuria nor the Chinese Government will accept the situation as permanent. They point out that twenty-seven to twenty-eight millions of the total population of thirty millions in Manchuria are Chinese, many of them bound by close family and other ties with the Chinese in the Provinces just south of the Great Wall; and that adjoining Manchuria is China, highly nationalistic, with over four hundred millions of people. The Chinese in Manchuria resent a Japanese-controlled Manchoukuo, and the Chinese south of the Wall resent the military conquest, as they regard it, of their northeastern Provinces. According to this view the support of Manchoukuo would probably result in recurring guerilla warfare in Manchuria, a continuation of the anti-Japanese boycott in China, and decades of bitterness—possibly of war—between China and Japan. Manchoukuo then does not offer to the Far East a peaceful, permanent settlement, but only another Alsace-Lorraine.

Another phase of this problem, and, for us, possibly the most important, is that this Manchurian issue is not one which concerns solely China and

Japan. It is a world issue. It concerns every state and every people, since it affects the world's entire peace structure. Since the Great War, the world has been laying a foundation of international agreements—the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg Pact, and the Nine Power Pact—on the basis of which it has fondly been hoped that we were building a new edifice of a better and a peaceful international relationship. It is that great peace structure of the world which is challenged by the situation in the Far East.

And finally, one who believes in the accuracy of the findings of the report and in the equity of its recommendations, may well wish that there were in the world at the present time some super-internationalist who could make a plea to China and Japan, backed by the public opinion of the world, a plea in the spirit in which Lincoln wrote his second inaugural, that these two peoples should start a new chapter of better international relations. Since the Lytton Report presents the results of the most thorough investigation ever carried out by an international commission into a political issue involving a great power, is it too much to ask that it should be accepted by the two countries at least as a basis for negotiation?

The world is not unmindful of the reluctance of China to accept, even temporarily, any measure of international assistance which may appear to limit the normal exercise of its full sovereign rights. It does not forget the difficulties which Japan is facing, the problem of supporting a great population in a small territory; nor the marvelous achievements of Japan, the transformation, within two generations, of a small, Oriental, feudal country, into one of the half-dozen great powers. But these considerations do not form the main issue. The main issue is: What road will lead out of these many difficulties with justice to Japan, to China, and to the rest of the world?

Since the time is quite gone, I should like to close with just a reference once again to the motif, the dominant thought of this Lytton Report: It is better to cooperate than it is to fight. On the basis of Manchoukuo there can be no cooperation between China and Japan, neither can there be good will. On the basis of the Lytton Report, there may be both cooperation and good will.

THE CHAIRMAN: There is no longer any excuse for anyone to say that he does not understand the Lytton Report. I have only one observation to make, which is not really a comment, on Dr. Blakeslee's speech, but the thought that we humans are so stupid we sometimes do, after a great conflict, what we might so much more easily have done before. Of course, we Westerners are in no position to throw stones at our friends bordering on

the Pacific, and yet it is difficult to refrain from expressing the thought that if only the League had been strong enough, international organizations had been powerful enough, to have named a Lytton Commission in the spring of 1931, and have had this report before September 18, 1931, the whole face of the situation in the Far East and the whole prospect for the peace of the world would be quite different.

Our second speaker, as I said earlier, has long been a student of the Far East, and his latest book, "China, the Collapse of a Civilization," is one which made those of us who read it feel that at last we had begun to understand China. Perhaps that was an inadequate or an inaccurate conclusion. I think it is difficult for any of us to understand any other people, but at any rate, Mr. Peffer, because of his sympathetic study in the Far East, is a competent student of current problems, and it is a pleasure to introduce him now. Mr. Peffer!

MR. NATHANIEL PEFFER

No, I have no special argument with Professor Blakeslee. On the whole, I find myself in agreement with him. Considered in a vacuum, the Lytton Report is an admirable document. It is fair, accurate; its recommendations are sound, and it has another quality which I confess had not occurred to me until Professor Blakeslee mentioned it today, namely, the religious and spiritual conversion of diplomats. I should say, more and more Lytton Reports!

Considered in a vacuum, I say the Lytton Report is an admirable document; of course, it has to be considered in a vacuum. Until just now I had taken it for granted that everybody else took it for granted that of course it would have no effect, and I still take it for granted; that is to say, surely no one can really believe that either party will accept it. Certainly I cannot believe and will not believe until I see that Japan will accept the Commission's recommendation and will carry it out. There is no sign that Japan will, and *a priori* there never was the slightest chance that it would.

My own belief is that the Lytton Report will remain an interesting and admirable example of international investigation in troubled areas, a method of operation for the conduct of international society when and if international society becomes civilized, and that is all. It is no more. This is not to the discredit of the Lytton Commission or the League of Nations.

Manchuria is a closed incident. It was a closed incident before the League of Nations got excited to Lytton Reports. It is settled now, I

believe, until it comes to final determination by the test of strength between China and Japan militarily and economically, or by the intervention of a third power, or by, as I say, the advent of a civilized international society, which cannot yet be foreseen.

The investigation of the Lytton Commission could not be confined to the events which the Lytton Report dealt with. The conflict which excited the League to Lytton Reports began long before 1931, of course, and can't be dealt with only as of 1931. It was foredoomed by the events and the forces and the causes which have been set in motion fifty or a hundred years ago and if it didn't come in 1931, it would have come in 1932, or in 1933, or in 1934. It couldn't have been dealt with by Lytton Reports or by Leagues of Nations beginning only after September, 1931. The basic conditions in the Far East have been a hundred years of rivalry among the strong for the privilege of dominating China for what can be gained from domination, and until you deal with that, it is perfectly futile to deal with any one of the many isolated incidents that will arise until you have a grand incident, a grand war.

The conditions, which have lasted in the Far East for at least fifty and perhaps a hundred years, breed wars, did breed wars, must breed wars, and will continue to breed wars as long as they exist.

All the so-called peace machinery of the world, all the international commissions of investigation, all the councils, and so forth, are of no avail whatever so long as those conditions obtain.

Of course, the Lytton Report didn't touch considerations like these; it had no mandate to do so. To begin with, if it had done so, it would have raised unpleasant questions for other people besides the Japanese.

What it has done, as Professor Blakeslee has so well summed up, is to prove Japan the aggressor, which was pretty obvious. Also it proved Japan to have offended against international morality, which would be of considerable importance if there were any international morality in the East, if there ever had been, or if there were any sign that there is going to be; which there isn't.

The Manchurian incident, therefore, is closed. It will remain closed, and there will be other Manchurian incidents, others like them, others more serious; they will remain unsolved, they will be repeated, always intensifying, until the conditions which bred this particular Manchurian incident or other Manchurian incidents like it, are removed by removing the causes.

While the so-called peace machinery ignores the causes which make for war, all the investigation commissions, all the bodies of inquiry, all the

assemblies and committees, are so much motion and rhetoric, and nothing else besides.

All, then, is exactly as it has been in the Far East; incidentally, everything that has happened in the last year has happened as if there had been no League of Nations. You must be aware of that. Japan has proceeded exactly as it would have proceeded in 1913; everything is as it was before notwithstanding the admirable report made by the Lytton Commission; everything is as it was before except for the entrance of one entirely new factor, and that is of a great deal more importance than the effort of the Lytton Commission. That new factor is the United States of America.

Although the Lytton Report may be the greatest document since the Renaissance, the most important historical development of the last year is the intervention of the United States of America in terms unique, positive, and utterly unmisunderstandable.

The American Government, through Mr. Stimson's two declarations, has said that we don't recognize anything that has happened in Manchuria since September, 1931; and a great deal has happened there. We don't recognize changes which have been brought about by Japanese force; but the changes have been brought about. We say that so far as the American Government is concerned, Manchuria is still a part of China; and Japan says that there is no Manchuria, there is a Manchoukuo, and that it is an independent country, although no Japanese living believes that.

At any rate, Japan says that much has happened since 1931; that Manchuria has been detached from China; and the American Government says that it has not; and that is a controversy about which you can't confine the issue to any metaphysical interpretation. It is a controversy that will come quite specifically to decision some day. It will come to showdown in this respect; the United States will back down, or the United States will back up its remarks, and there is only one way to back them up.

This, incidentally, is the government that wouldn't be, what we call so prettily, "entangled" in Europe. Well, we may or may not be willing to be involved with a part of the world that owes us fourteen billion dollars, but nevertheless, we are involved in Asia, and that fact is the most important fact to American persons today.

The American Government has a policy, and the American Government has committed the American people to a policy which can be supported only by force. You have a policy. You may not know that you have one. You may not have wanted one. You have never been asked whether you wanted one. But, you have a policy none the less. From which it may be deduced that this is a democratic country, governed by the consent of the governed, in the most efficient way possible—the consent is taken for granted. The new political science!

At any rate it is irrelevant whether or not the Japanese people will be as evangelically smitten as were the diplomats who investigated the controversy, and will or will not accept the Lytton Report, although they have indicated they will not, and most of us who know the Far East agree that they will not. The concrete deposit of the last year is just this—that America and Japan, as they stand today, are in a position that can have only one consummation in international relations, whether you want it or not. It is for us, it is for the American people, to determine whether they really want to be so committed; whether Manchuria—which, you will admit if you are quite honest with yourselves, you couldn't find on the map until eighteen months ago—means enough to them to stake the lives of their sons. If so, very well; then coolly, calmly, with reason, knowing what you do, go ahead on the lines on which you are going; but, if not, don't; and, if not, make it quite clear to your government that you won't.

More important than that, it is time to consider not isolated episodes and incidents; it is time—not to go with 'rikisha coolies to see the exact spot on the bridge where the exact bomb fell, which is of awfully little consequence—it is time to look at the Far East not as a place where one incident occurred, but as a place where there have been wars for two generations and will be wars for two generations more unless there is fundamental change.

For that reason I cannot, with all due respect, with admiration for the fact that the Lytton investigation is something that could not have happened in 1913 and, therefore, marks a certain progress, I cannot take the Lytton Report very seriously, and I don't think that in five years from now you will have any reason whatever to do so either.

It is much more important to go at the conditions which will keep you sending Lytton Commissions every three years for the next hundred years, until you send your armies and navies, according to all historical precedent.

Well, what are the conditions? They are, in a word, to get a lot out of the Far East, each to get more than anyone else. For a hundred years we have been trying to get our own way in China, by licking the Chinese and by licking everybody else who wanted to lick them, first.

You have had, in other words, in technical language, the imperial struggle for domination of China, and as long as that struggle exists, of course you are going to have wars in China, *of course,* or in the Balkans, or Africa, or any place else where you have that struggle. And that is the only question about the Far East that matters.

As long as there are going to be spoils in the Far East, you are going to fight for them. That isn't dogmatic; it is the reading of history.

If you do really want peace in the Far East, then you won't argue about

the Lytton Commission, and certainly you won't argue too hotly about Mr. Stimson's interpretations of what exists in Manchuria; instead, knowing that certain causes always have certain effects, and having had experience of the effects, you will say, "We will get at the business of removing the causes"; that is, you will declare the old game in China over.

Now we won't do that in the spirit of nice liberalism. It means giving up things that we don't want to give up. It means giving up things that are worth a lot to us.

Concretely, if you really wanted to, you would call another Washington Conference, not a shabby farce like the one ten years ago, which plainly, obviously, never considered a single important question that had to do with the Far East. You would have a real one, and say, "We have all been in this game, including the patron saint of altruism and idealism, the United States of America; we have all been in this game. It is a game that even by the hardest dollars and cents interpretation doesn't pay (because if you chucked in all the trade we may have with China for the next ten years, it wouldn't pay for six months of war)." We have all been in this game and we have all played the same way. The game can have only one end, therefore, we say to ourselves, "We will chuck it. The old game is over."

Don't put Japan on trial alone as if it were the only offender. Of course Japan is guilty. You don't have to conduct minute investigations at the corner of a bridge to know that; but, everybody else has been guilty. Japan is guilty because it knows perfectly well if it doesn't go about being guilty now, as soon as we are able to, we will anyway. Japan's reading of history may be too cynical. It may be there has been a new access of international morality since 1918. There are some evidences, but they are not robust evidences, or evidences enough on which any realistic nation like the Japanese could foreswear the opportunity now given to dig themselves in. In the interval in which the great Western powers which conducted the rampage for fifty years find themselves winded by the effects of their own private squabble in Europe, in the interval in which they are winded, is the time for the Japanese to dig themselves in, before we get our wind back. There are two possible interpretations of our restraint. One is that we have restrained ourselves, we of the West, in the last ten years, because we have had a new conception of international morality; and the other interpretation is that we have been tired. We have brought up Japan in the harsh and rotten world. We taught them this.

The Japanese are not, I believe, thinking of China alone, as Professor Blakeslee said, they are not thinking of Manchuria alone; they are thinking of Russia, and England, and France, and the United States, and especially the United States. You will observe that although our trade in Manchuria is trivial, our interests even more trivial, we leap to the front two days

after Manchuria is involved, although we have managed to keep a very philosophical detachment about countries in which bank failures may result in closing our own banks.

Now, if you really want peace in the Far East, you have to go at the causes of war. You will bring together the powers that have been involved in the wars in the Far East before. You stand each one against the wall and say, "Deliver!"

Oh, that is tempting to say to you, and it is gratifying to hear, because it strikes responsive liberalistic chords, but it won't be easy to do. In the first place, of course, it is so tempting to say, "We shall be, as always, friends of China," while other people will say "Why should we be friends of China?" as if there ever had been any likelihood of being friends of China in anything that really was vital to us. You will eliminate immediately the question of China's good or not China's good. You will eliminate all questions of whether or not this is to China's interest. It may be and it may not be. You will think of it only in terms of self-defense, of self-preservation, as a measure to prevent us killing ourselves off in war.

You will do it, then, first of all for our sake, as the only means of preventing war, and you will do it quite conscious that it will be a costly business, a terribly destructive business, just now when we can't stand costs.

I have no illusion that, for example, to give back all our concessions, and so forth, in China—I have no illusions that that won't hurt us very much. It will. I have no illusion that China will immediately proceed to unification, and peace, and efficiency. It won't. In the interval, therefore, we take the loss. I have no illusion, also, that at such a conference or by any other method (I don't use the word "conference" in any of its sacred connotations), we shall immediately bring about that upsurge of charitableness in the Japanese which Professor Blakeslee anticipates as a result of the Lytton Report. I don't believe so, but if ever you are going to be able to deal with the Japanese convincingly, if ever you are going to be in a position to levy pressure on the Japanese with effectiveness, first you have to remove from the Japanese their suspicion of ourselves. And you have to realize first that a great deal of that suspicion is warranted.

I don't know that that which I have to propose is practical. If it isn't practical, then peace is not practical; then you might just as well forget all the talk about committees and technique of peace by conference and inquiries and disarmament. If that isn't practical, peace isn't practical. I don't know that peace is practical, but at any rate, we are sure we have never tried to secure it.

The one thing we are sure of is that in the Far East, as in Europe, the

existing system has only one end product, namely, WAR; and it isn't ending in the Far East; it is only beginning—it is only beginning. We are sure that if you leave things as they are, with Mr. Stimson's declarations, we will have war. The alternative is to turn our backs on a hundred years and chuck the game in the Far East. The alternative may or may not produce peace, but if it has only one chance in five, it is worth trying.

You can't get peace by mechanism. You can't get anything by mechanism, as we ought to have discovered in the last three years. There is a peculiarly American illusion that any tangled and difficult situation can be dealt with by a slick contrivance. It can't. So long as you have the conditions which make for war, it doesn't make a bit of difference what they talk about in Geneva. And so far as you have been led to believe that we are anywhere nearer progress towards peace by what they do in Geneva, then no matter how excellent, how admirable, how praiseworthy the things that Geneva does intrinsically, as the Lytton Report is intrinsically admirable, praiseworthy, nevertheless, the things that are done there are dangerous. They lull us into false security.

This you must remember: In the Far East we are today where Europe was in 1905, and saving only miracles, there isn't anything on earth to prevent another 1914 from coming. You may prevent it; I don't know. You may try to prevent it, or you may let it drift, and talking fair words is a way of drifting. Again I say you have conditions in the Far East which cannot possibly mean anything else but war, and those conditions are not confined to Manchuria. You can't isolate Manchuria from the whole Far East. If those conditions remain, you will have war. If you attempt to get rid of them, it will be costly. It will be costly, difficult, and take a long time. You can't do it in one year or ten, but if you start today, you might get conditions of peace in ten years, or in twenty. If you wait for twenty years, you won't get it for twenty years after that.

If you want immediate results of the kind technically called constructive, it is hopeless to bring about peace in the Far East. It will be a long, complicated process. Whenever you begin, it will be long anyway. You might as well begin now.

In the meantime the American people must face the fact that in the last year they have been placed definitely in a new position. They are definitely entangled, and they are entangled in the toughest part of the world.

THE CHAIRMAN: I don't know whether Mr. Peffer took issue with Dr. Blakeslee or not, but I suspect that he has raised some questions which will be a little difficult for the rest of us to answer. I am not quite sure

whether Mr. Peffer pleased his Japanese friends more or his Chinese friends more. Certainly he was not particularly concerned to cause his American friends to sleep well of nights.

Where is the first question, addressed to Dr. Blakeslee or to Mr. Peffer? Perhaps there is some good liberal in the audience. Mr. Peffer did us the honor of suggesting this was a liberal audience. Perhaps one might rise and ask a question rooted in his defense of liberalism or League mechanism, or whatever you may call it. Where is the first question?

MR. MARBURG: *What is the first step Mr. Peffer would suggest making? Do I understand he wanted to give up the special concessions in China? Has he any suggestion as to what way that may be brought about?*

MR. PEFFER: I have my doubts whether we would even come to the first step. If we wanted to, yes, we would summon every power to a conference. We would not say to the Japanese as we did at Geneva, "Are you guilty or not?" We wouldn't put the Japanese on trial but we would deal with the situation *de novo*. Then we would give up our imperialistic spoils, all of us. We would do that first, the onus being on the Western powers who started the game. We would do that first of all as a means of removing Japanese suspicion and also as a means of assuaging Chinese nationalism.

What the Japanese have done to Manchuria we must all do to keep our privileges there; sooner or later we will all have to give the Chinese a licking—either give up or lick them. They want to get rid of the privileges we have fastened on them, and Manchuria happened to be the issue to concentrate on at this time. When they concentrate on Shanghai, we will all have to do as the Japanese did in Shanghai or give up Shanghai.

We might do as we did in 1921; every nation drew up a list of what they owned in China, and everybody forgot about it; it raised too many unpleasant questions. Or this time we can say, we take what we have and yield it. This is what we put into the pool for peace. The Japanese won't give up anything for the present, but they never will give up anything until that step is first taken. Then we might be in a position to levy pressure on Japan because our own conscience would have come clean for the first time, and that is a very important fact in the Far East. No one in the Far East has any faith whatever in the Western powers and there isn't any reason whatever why anybody should.

You can't talk of this in terms of one, two, three, four steps or blueprint; you have to uproot a psychology, which you can't do in one meeting or one week, but you have to do it and that is the first concrete step. It will take a long time before the Chinese are convinced that we wish to give up anything or the Japanese are convinced that they don't have to fear

us. But that is the first step. If you can manage to get the first step taken, I think the others will all follow automatically.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Peffer is becoming almost cheerful despite himself. Where is the next question? Perhaps it may bring him a little further along.

COLONEL M. THOMAS TCHOU: If I did not know which of the two speakers was on the Commission of Inquiry I would have been sure that Mr. Nathaniel Peffer wasn't on the Commission; but he has led us further than the contents of the Lytton Report. Personally I am interested to know whether he is certain that if America takes a policy of indifference and renunciation, that will insure peace for America or for the rest of the world. Why not let the rest of the world alone, he seems to indicate. They can go anywhere they like; but is he sure this will spell peace for America?

If I may add a word of explanation, I do not think, if I understand this country aright, that this country wanted to make war on Germany in 1917, and you wanted to keep out of it. Your distinguished former President Wilson, when he took up his post for a second term, made it quite clear that his policy was to keep America out of the conflict in Europe, but, did you keep out of the conflict in Europe? Of course, President Wilson could have tried to pursue that policy and, if he were willing to entirely disregard what he might or I might consider to be the honor of a great nation, he might have avoided that war.

I am not at issue with Mr. Peffer, but I deplore his insistence that in future the world will have no other way of settling international differences than by force. And if that process should continue, it is sure to lead to disaster, for the world is no longer so divided as it once was—we people of China tried our best to keep the rest of the world out of our shores and, lo! and behold! you are all with us and we are with you. We can't keep the world divided, so if you do believe there is still a possible hope to stop an enormous, titanic conflict that would swallow up all of us, no matter where we are located, I believe the sooner you act to stop the present development toward a world conflict, the better, the safer, by strengthening the treaties and organizations for peace and not by neglecting them.

If I understand the situation aright, when you see a man robbing his neighbor, first taking things from his garden, then going into his house and taking his furniture, maltreating his children, it is not the part of wisdom to say, "This is a matter between the man and his neighbor; the community is safe; by keeping our hands off, we are all safe." Personally, I believe that is not the way to safety.

We are all in a society of nations and I do not believe we are promoting peace by letting things go entirely the way force will take us. If we were to believe only in force, I, for one would not be here; I would go back and I know where to go. Why should you, moreover, have a Foreign Policy Association? If you only believe in force you may join an arsenal, an army or navy or an air force, and you would not be interested in anything else; you wouldn't need any Foreign Policy Association. I believe this is not the case and I want to raise this question.

THE CHAIRMAN: Will you repeat your question, in one word?

COLONEL TCHOU: *Let us suppose that America withdraws her interests from the Far East, whether that be in violation of treaties or disregard of national honor or not, will that policy actually bring peace to America?*

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Peffer, if I might interpret Mr. Tchou's question in simpler terms, I would say a part of what he is asking is: *Would America's withdrawal from the Stimson Doctrine leave us safe from war or make for peace?*

MR. PEFFER: Would withdrawal assure peace? I don't know. I only know this, that the doctrine itself is one which you can't support only by words. I haven't said that the American people ought not to back it up. I have said, if the American people coolly, calmly, and with reason, believe that the Manchurian question means enough to them to risk war, then by all means stand by the doctrine; but only if by reason they have come to that conclusion, instead of drifting to the point where, having been committed, it will then be a question: Are we good patriots and idealists; that is to say, will we stand by our Government?

The question is whether we shall initiate or our officialdom shall initiate, and whether we shall stand committed without regard to who commits. I don't know that withdrawing from the Stimson Doctrine will bring about peace. I have said, as a matter of fact, that you will not get peace anyway unless you do something much more than withdraw from the Stimson Doctrine, or stand by the Stimson Doctrine.

MR. INGERSOLL: *I should like to ask Mr. Peffer whether he thinks that granting independence to the Philippines under some international treaty would be an important step in the direction which he has been outlining.*

MR. PEFFER: I hadn't thought about it particularly, but I suppose it would be. In any case, that is a minor question. The Philippines is a minor question except to the Filipinos.

MR. INGERSOLL: *Is it minor in the eyes of Japan and isn't our presence very largely responsible for the Japanese position?*

MR. PEFFER: Largely, I think you can say what is major in the eyes

of Japan is what seems to be our conception of destiny in the Far East. We have been moving in that direction for fifty years and that is what they are worried about. I think peace or war in the Far East will be determined in China, not in the Philippines.

THE CHAIRMAN: A few minutes ago Mr. Tchou, a former official of the Nanking Government asked a question of Mr. Peffer, so I am going to suggest that Dr. Roy H. Akagi, visiting lecturer on Japanese affairs at Columbia, ask a question or preface or follow it by a statement, if he wishes to do so. Dr. Akagi, do you have anything to say at this point?

DR. ROY H. AKAGI: I thought Japan was brought to the bar of the World Court and I thought that was enough. I came here today as one of the table decorations and I find myself brought before the bar of this meeting. However, I shall not let this opportunity go by in just the same manner as a little schoolboy who, when asked to define the word "vacuum," said, "My dear teacher, somehow I can't put it into my words, but I have it in my head."

Instead of asking questions, I might be given the privilege of emphasizing the fundamental contention which Professor Blakeslee has made and also another contention which Mr. Peffer has made.

The first one, which Professor Blakeslee has made, is that the difficulty in Manchuria can be settled only on the basis of Sino-Japanese cooperation. That has been Japan's policy, as far as I understand, during the past ten years, under the guidance of Baron Shidehara. Yet last year, say in October or September, if the whole world had that attitude before it threw up its hands and said, "Japan is wrong; China is right; let's do everything to prevent Japan," the greatest discovery of the Lytton Commission in the Far East, I am inclined to think would have been that the current conflict could have been settled long ago without going into years of heated discussions.

Japan always maintained that in the Far East Japan and China should always be left unhampered to talk the matter over. If you read over the Japanese diplomatic papers, you will find that contention repeatedly voiced, but the world laughed at it. Now we are slowly coming to adopt the same position, namely, "Let China and Japan talk it over in a friendly way." The world, through the Lytton Commission Report, asks Japan and China to do so. That is very important, ladies and gentlemen. No matter whether your interests are involved in the Far East or not, unless Japan and China are left alone to talk the matter over, the Manchurian question will not be solved. That is the great truth, the greatest discovery of the Lytton Report.

Mr. Peffer kindly made clear before this audience what Japanese ordinarily cannot say. He called your attention to the larger aspect of the Far

Eastern problem, namely, the whole world is involved in the Far East in terms of national rights of various powers.

Japan is willing to accept whatever world opinion will entertain concerning Japan's place as it should be; yet, before the Manchurian problem is to be settled, the whole question of international rights in the Far East must be settled. If you want Japan to give up certain rights involved in the present conflict, you must assure Japan that other powers in the Far East are also willing to give up their rights.

One noted editor said: "Japan had a fine case in Manchuria, but she acted clumsily." There in one sentence is summarized Japan's position.

May I call your attention to the fact that the Lytton Commission very clearly demonstrates before the world that Japan had a fine case in the Far East, but the world did not know it on September 19, 1931. The Lytton Commission, an impartial commission, after prolonged investigation, presents the facts which prove that Japan had a fine case.

Now the second part, that Japan acted clumsily: I personally admitted it more than once. I have no intention of trying to justify Japan's action in Manchuria or elsewhere, in a wholesale way, but I do believe that Japan did not act without reason. Japan acted clumsily in the light of your own ideas. Viewed orientally, in the light of the present stage of the development of international political philosophy, Japan believes that she had a justifiable ground to act in the way she acted. If so, may I present this conclusion for your thinking, namely, if what Japan said all along but what you did not believe has been demonstrated clearly by the Lytton Commission's Report, would it be too much to ask the world to believe what Japan believes the future of Manchuria should be in the light of the conditions prevailing in the Far East? A future Lytton Commission may write a similar report showing Japan's procedure as justifiable and right, notwithstanding the present report. In other words, if there were room to justify Japan's fine case, after thorough investigation, wouldn't there be equally believable room in the future to justify Japan's present policy as the only procedure in the Far East under the existing conditions? Thank you!

THE CHAIRMAN: I don't believe Dr. Akagi asked a question. I think that question was a rhetorical one, so if Professor Blakeslee or Mr. Peffer interpreted it as a definite question, I should be glad to have them answer it. We have twelve minutes more at the outside, so I suggest that we have possible questions quickly from the floor.

QUESTION: *I should like to ask Dr. Blakeslee what specific action he thinks the State Department will have to take if it becomes necessary to make the Stimson Doctrine effective.*

THE CHAIRMAN: The question is asked of Dr. Blakeslee and I think he might properly ask to be excused from answering it because it in a way might seem to involve the Department of which he has been a part, but he can use his own judgment on that.

DR. BLAKESLEE: First of all, if Mr. Peffer will not mind, I should like to express the view that there is nothing fundamentally new about the Stimson Doctrine expressed in the note of January 7. If you will dig up the source material, you will find that the United States sent a joint note to China and Japan on May 13, 1915, shortly after the twenty-one demands, which in a way was a precedent for this note of January 7. The Declaration of May 13th stated: ". . . the Government of the United States. . . can not recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of China and Japan impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the Open Door policy." The note of January 7 is new only in its reference to the obligations of the multilateral treaty, popularly known as the Kellogg Pact or the Pact of Paris, and this treaty was not in existence in 1915. The note of January 7 contains the clause that the American Government "does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris. . ."

As for the Lytton Report it is a report made to the Council of the League by a Commission appointed by the Council, and until the Council shall have taken action regarding it, it does not appear necessary for the United States Government to express an official judgment upon it.

Shortly after the United States Government issued the note of January 7, the Assembly of the League, on March 11, passed a similar resolution. The situation today then is that nearly all of the states of the world either directly or through their official delegates in the Assembly, have stated as a principle and doctrine that no situation, treaty, or agreement should be recognized which has been brought about contrary to the obligations of the Pact of Paris.

In forecasting the course of action which the United States will probably take in the future, it may be helpful to keep in mind the policy announced by our Government from the beginning of the controversy. It has stated that it wished to cooperate sympathetically with the League; and that it would attempt, so far as seemed possible, in each instance, to reinforce the efforts made by the League to bring about a pacific and conciliatory settlement of this issue.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Peffer's character as an historian seems to have been called in question by Professor Blakeslee's suggestion that the Stimson Doctrine is not a new doctrine, as Mr. Peffer seemed to indicate, but merely the carrying out of a traditional American doctrine. Mr. Peffer whispered to me, which I interpreted as meaning he had a somewhat different interpretation to put upon that. Mr. Peffer!

MR. PEFFER: There was a precedent for the Stimson Doctrine. We did take action in 1915, but by no means so unequivocal. We said we wouldn't recognize anything in contravention of certain treaties and that was a matter of interpretation. Mr. Stimson has said, first of all, practically the same thing, that we wouldn't recognize any change brought about by force, and then he has translated what he said. In his statement in August, he said we wouldn't recognize fruits of aggression. Then he defined Manchuria as a fruit of aggression. We made a statement in 1915, and we backed down and forgot it. If the assumption is that we are going to back down again, there is no objection, but if that is an assumption, why have asserted the doctrine? I take it for granted that we really mean what we say. We did not mean what we said in 1915.

It is perfectly true that the League of Nations made a similar statement, but you observe that Professor Blakeslee himself added a qualification. He said "for all practical purposes." The word "practical" is eligible to subsequent definition and to all having regard to world politics, the adjective "practical" will mean that even though all of us have taken the stand that we don't recognize Manchoukuo, when it comes to implementing that stand, it will be left to the United States of America to do so.

THE CHAIRMAN: Madame Kung has a question she would like to ask of Dr. Akagi. Madame Kung!

MADAME KUNG: *If I may be permitted to ask a question of Professor Akagi, why didn't Japan take her case to the League of Nations, being a member of the League?*

The Professor said that the case should be settled between China and Japan. Japan did try to settle the twenty-one demands and China would not recognize it; on the one hand pressing us; on the other hand, told the world that there was no such thing. That is one of the reasons why we are afraid to settle with Japan without the world looking on.

What happened in Manchuria the 18th of September last year? The official statement given out by Japan was that it was the doings of some junior officials. *Now was that aggression, the war that took place in Manchuria, the doings of a Japanese minor official, or a part of the plan of the Government of Japan?*

Dr. Akagi: In answer to the question, I might say this: Japan always believed that the Manchurian question must be solved between China and Japan, not by any international body which historically, racially, and psychologically is not directly related to those problems; therefore, Japan's procedure, if you study it historically, aimed at a sort of cooperative solution of the problems by Japan and China.

If you will allow me to indicate just one or two instances, last spring, the spring of 1931, Japan and China, through Japanese proposal, tried to solve railroad problems in Manchuria through direct negotiations. China appointed a commission and Japan appointed a commission. They were to go over all of their intricate and delicate railroad problems in Manchuria. As they proceeded, one thing after another happened. Japan charged China for not acting in good faith in the negotiations. China charged Japan with the same thing. Nevertheless these commissions persisted through delays upon delays Here was one attempt which was actually being made to settle the railroad questions, and if the world could have encouraged Japan and China in this procedure, it was not necessary to take cases to the League of Nations.

There is another and better illustration. Just before September 18, China and Japan were on the verge of settling pending issues through direct negotiations. Baron Shidehara, Japan's Foreign Minister, and Mr. T. V. Soong, China's Finance Minister, got together and finally reached an understanding on appointing a Sino-Japanese commission to study all the existing problems between Japan and China, in Manchuria, and to find a formula of solving those problems. Just before the September 18 affair, that agreement, a sort of unofficial understanding, was effected, and on September 19, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese chargé d'affaires, actually proceeded to organize such a commission in cooperation with Mr. T. V. Soong. If that arrangement could have been encouraged and carried out, the whole outstanding problems, I am inclined to think, could have been solved. Therefore, with such a commission in the course of formation between Mr. T. V. Soong and Baron Shidehara, there was no necessity of Japan's taking cases to the League of Nations.

In short, practical steps were being taken by Japan and China to solve their difficulties when the September 18 affair happened, and when it happened, Japan discovered that the world pressure was unsympathetically brought upon Japan on behalf of China, and that is where the cooperative enterprise ended.

Mr. K. C. Li: *May I ask a question? May each of the main speakers answer Madame Kung's question, as the Japanese professor has not quite answered this question?*

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. K. C. Li suggests that since Mr. Akagi's answer to Madame Kung's question, seems incomplete to him would each of the two main speakers in just a minute or two reply to Madame Kung's question. Mr. Peffer, I don't know that you are an authority on League matters; perhaps you might be the first person to reply.

MR. PEFFER: I don't know why Japan didn't take it to the League except that Japan has never had any intention, no matter what it may say for official purposes, of having any third party interfere in the question of Manchuria. It has indicated it had no such intention before the development of September 18, 1931, and since then.

I believe time will prove it will have no such intention after November 14, 1932, when the Lytton Report is presented to the League. Japan does not regard international peace machinery as applying to Manchuria. There is no record of any kind that the Japanese have any intention of ever letting any third party interfere or have anything whatever to say about Manchuria.

THE CHAIRMAN: After Professor Blakeslee answers, I am going to be forced by the exigencies of the watch to declare the meeting adjourned. Professor Blakeslee!

DR. BLAKESLEE: Mr. Chairman, it is true that one of the outstanding facts in this controversy is that Japan has regarded the issue as one solely between Japan and China.

As to Dr. Akagi's statement I might add the comment that it is true that during the months before the September 18 incident, the Japanese Foreign Office, under the leadership of Baron Shidehara, was attempting to bring about a solution by diplomatic and peaceful means. The difficulty was that another group in Japan preferred a military solution. Finally, expressing a personal opinion, I believe it would have been to the advantage of all if Japan had brought this matter before the League of Nations.

THE CHAIRMAN: On your behalf I should like to express our great thanks to Mr. Peffer and Professor Blakeslee, and also to the others who have participated in the discussion and I hope that all members of the Association will get the Lytton Report and study it.

READING SUGGESTIONS

An excellent study outline with bibliography on "The Manchurian Conflict," prepared by Mr. T. A. Bisson of the F. P. A. Research Staff, 10c. a copy.

The following group of eight *Foreign Policy Reports* are also available at a special price of $1.50 per set plus postage; single copies 25c.:

International Action on the Lytton Report. November, 1932

The Rise of Fascism in Japan. October, 1932

The Weakness of Peace Machinery. September, 1932

The Soviet Union and Japan in the Far East. August, 1932

The League and the Sino-Japanese Dispute. July, 1932

Japan and Manchoukuo. June, 1932

Railway Rivalries in Manchuria between China and Japan. April, 1932

Basic Treaty Issues in Manchuria between China and Japan. December, 1931

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